It is now widely recognised that traditional demographic dependency ratios (DDRs), such as the oldage dependency ratio relating the number of people aged 65+ to the working-age population, provide a poor measure of the socio-economic changes that ageing societies will bring about. In the future, older generations will have increasingly better health and are likely to work longer. By combining population projections and National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data for seven European countries, we project the quantitative impact of ageing on public finances until 2040 and compare it to projected DDRs. We then simulate the public finance impact of changes in three key indicators related to the policy responses to population ageing -net immigration, healthy ageing and longer working lives -by linking age-specific public-health transfers and labour-market participation rates to changes in mortality. Four main findings emerge: first, the simple old-age dependency ratio overestimates the future public finance challenges faced by the countries studied -significantly so for some countries, e.g. Austria, Finland and Hungary. Second, healthy ageing has a modest effect (on public finances) except in the case of Sweden, where it is substantial. Third, the long-run effect of immigration is well captured by the simple DDR measure if immigrants are similar to the native population. Finally, increasing the length of working lives is central to addressing the public finance challenge of ageing. Extending the length of working lives by three to four years over the next 25 years -equivalent to the increase in life expectancy -severely limits the impact of ageing on public transfers. 
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Introduction
European societies are ageing. According to Eurostat population projections, the median age of the population in EU will increase from 41 years in 2010 to 46.4 in 2040. At that time 26.9% of the population will be 65 years or older. The well-known causes are increasing longevity and low fertility in European populations. The challenges posed by this development for public finances related to pensions and healthcare expenditures have often been framed in terms of the concept of the demographic dependency ratio, old-age burden or support ratiothe ratio of older people to the working-age population (World Bank, 1994; Cutler et al., 1990) .
The old-age demographic dependency burden, often defined as the number of people aged 65 and older over the number of people in the age group 20 to 64 years old, has sometimes been supplemented with the share of very old defined as the number of people aged 85+ over the working-age population to illustrate that public transfers in the form of health care are particularly large for this age group. Thus, the fact that we tend to live longer is often, at least implicitly, perceived to spell decline, lower pensions and generally lower welfare.
However, a growing number of authors have recently pointed to the fact that a measure based on chronological age alone is misleading in societies where longevity is increasing substantially with each generation (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007 Lutz, 2009; Shoven, 2010) . Sanderson and Scherbov (2013) argue that it is more appropriate to use a measure such as prospective age, i.e. remaining life expectancy. Using prospective age, the ratio of old to young can more usefully be calculated by relating the number of people with less than 15 years of remaining life expectancy to the number of people (or some subset thereof) with more than 15 years of remaining life expectancy. Other measures exist that similarly account for changes in longevity (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2013) .
Building on this literature, Spijker and MacInnes (2013) have recently gone so far as to call ageing a 'non-problem', at least for the UK. They propose a more dynamic measure -what they call a 'real old-age dependency ratio'. Instead of using chronological age, they relate the number of people with prospective age less than 15 years to the number of people in employment, arguing that the development in this ratio better reflects the 'old-age burden' and associated challenges. This can be seen as a dynamic version of the simple headcount demographic dependency ratio where age cut-off points are moved along with improvements in life expectancy. Measured this way, they emphasise that the real old-age dependency ratio * Mikkel Barslund is Research Fellow at CEPS and Marten von Werder is a researcher at the Freie Universität Berlin. The authors thank Giampaolo Lanzieri, Daniel Gros and participants at the VID conference in Vienna, December 2014, for helpful suggestions and comments. Special thanks to Tarmo Valkonen for many detailed comments and recommendations for improvements. The authors are responsible for all errors and omissions.
has been falling since the 1980s for major European countries. In favour of measuring the oldage burden by a prospective measure of age, such as the real old-age dependency ratio, rather than one building on chronological age is the finding that some public transfers depend less on chronological age and more on prospective age. The cost of individual healthcare is closely related to proximity to death as opposed to years from birth (Felder et al., 2000; Bjørner and Arnberg, 2012) .
While acknowledging the broader point, Barslund and Werder (2014) have confronted this measure and, in particular, the value of `backcasting' the real old-age dependency measure. They emphasise that National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) (Mason et al., 2006) show that for many countries pension transfers form the largest part of public old-age transfers until rather late in life. Until recently pension ages in many countries had been unchanged for decades with a downward trend in the average age of retirement (OECD, 2013) . The real old-age dependency ratio may be too dynamic with respect to implicitly assumed behavioural changes regarding retirement and length of working life, whereas the traditional static old-age DDR is useful in measuring the economic challenges faced by an ageing society absent behavioural changes. In addition, relying only on a dynamic measure risks masking the policy challenge in changing individual behaviour, in particular related to retirement.
Given this background, the contribution of this paper remains modest. In essence our goal is to shed light on how NTAs can qualify the discussion surrounding ageing and the old-age burden along three important dimensions related to: healthcare spending and the concept of healthy ageing, measuring the impact of migration and longer working lives. These are three central building blocks when it comes to meeting the public finance challenges of ageing. In this context we emphasise the usefulness of NTAs to study relative magnitudes of impacts on public finances of different scenarios over a range of EU countries, in contrast to more detailed budgetary impacts provided by single-country inter-temporal models (Storesletten, 2000; Schou, 2006; Hansen et al., 2015; Sánchez-Romero, 2013; Lassila, 2014) .
In the course of this exercise we rely on NTAs to provide age-specific government (net) transfers, which allow for a more precise assessment of dependency ratios. 1 These data enable us to take account not only of changes in the composition of the population above 65, but also the composition of the working-age population, and changes in the number and composition of dependent young people. We denote the resulting measure as the 'transfer-based demographic dependency ratio' or 'transfer-based' DDR. 2 When looking at the effect of healthy ageing and longer working lives, we link transfers to mortality rates via the given agetransfer link provided by the NTAs. In doing so we connect to the literature on prospective ageing and more dynamic dependency ratios (see Mason et al., 2015 for a similar approach). The former is a static approach in the sense that no behavioural changes are assumed, whereas the latter is dynamic in assuming that behaviour changes in response to changes in mortality.
Working at an aggregate multi-country level and with a static framework, we acknowledge upfront the uncertainties surrounding the results. However, with NTAs becoming available for a growing number of countries, and the prospect of country NTAs with different base years and more detailed breakdown of transfers, making it possible to better validate assumptions, the present approach should yield additional insight into the policy challenges of ageing.
As a preview to our results, we find that the simple old-age DDR overestimates the future public-finance challenges faced by the countries studied. In some case, for example Austria, Finland and Hungary, this overestimation is substantial. Second, healthy ageing -keeping health transfers constant for a given mortality rate -has a modest effect except in the case of Sweden where it is important. Third, the long-run effect of immigration is well captured by the simple old-age DDR measure if the common assumption that immigrants are similar to natives is maintained. The immediate to short-term impact of immigration tends to be overstated by the simple old-age DDR measure. Finally, increasing the length of working lives is central in addressing the public-finance challenge of ageing. By linking government transfers to mortality, we project that extending the average length of working lives by around 3-5 years over the next 25 years -roughly equivalent to the gain in life expectancy -will substantially limit the impact of ageing on public transfers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: we briefly describe in the next section the concept of National Transfer Accounts and note important caveats that are relevant for our application. This is followed by an outline of the methodology employed. The main results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
National Transfer Accounts and population data
This article uses population statistics from the EUROPOP2013 projections, which are produced by Eurostat 3 and cover all 28 EU countries. We use the base scenario, but detailed assumptions on age-specific fertility, mortality and net migration are available to facilitate alternative projections. The projection horizon goes from the base year of 2013 to 2080, although results are presented only up to 2040. They are based on a convergence scenario in which the key demographic contributors -fertility and mortality -are assumed to converge towards the same value in the very long run. Among central features of the latter scenario are an increase in fertility for most countries (exceptions are Ireland, Sweden and France) and a further increase in life expectancy for all countries with convergence towards the value of lowmortality countries. Migration projections are country-specific.
The population projections are paired with NTAs for the seven countries listed in Table 1 , which are available from the national transfer accounts project ( The concept of NTAs is described concisely and in-depth elsewhere (Mason et al., 2006; Prskawetz and Sambt, 2014; UN, 2013) . Below we provide only the essential ingredients for our application together with a few caveats.
In short, an NTA breaks down the most important aggregate economic flows on one-year population age groups for a given year. The flows include public and private consumption, income and transfers. The latter flow, transfers, which is the most important component from the point of view of our analysis, is further broken down into transfers related to education, healthcare, pensions and other public and private transfers. This breakdown is done via information from micro surveys. Aggregates are calibrated by reference to related quantities in the system of national accounts.
Using the information embedded in the age profile of public transfers in an NTA, it is possible to give a much more detailed description of the impact of changes in the population composition on the public budget. In particular, compared to the traditionally computed DDR, 5 it is possible to assess the effect of changes in the composition of populations aged 20-64 and 65+. Furthermore, as emphasised in Hammer et al. (2015) , the age limits on when an individual is, on average, a net contributor can be endogenously determined from the transfer profiles.
In this study we utilise one additional advantage of NTAs: the one-year age-specific transfer profiles allow for a correspondence from mortality (or, almost equivalently, remaining life expectancy) via age to the net transfers in the base year. This allows us to link net transfers (and implicitly health status, retirement behaviour and related labour-market participation) to mortality rates in the projection. As an example, Figure 1 shows net public transfers for Germany as a function of (the logarithm of) mortality rates in the base year for the German NTA, together with a mortality age plot. Unfortunately, age-specific transfers are not available beyond the age of 90. 6 We take transfers to be constant beyond that age.
Figure 1. DE net public transfers as a function of mortality (2013)
Note: The RHS shows logarithmic mortality for each age in 2013. The LHS plots net transfers against logarithmic mortality based on the NTA for Germany in 2003 and the RHS plot.
Source: NTAs and Eurostat.
Caveats and limitations
There are important caveats to the use of NTAs. First, because NTAs build on the system of national accounts, they are only available with a time lag. This means that behavioural changes from recent reforms are not reflected in the data. As an example: the NTA from Germany is from 2003 (Table 1 ) and therefore predates the Hartz reforms and later reforms to the retirement age. Secondly, it is important to understand that they are strictly static in nature. Thus, the underlying assumption behind using an NTA for a given year to assess transfers in the future is that the world will 'stand still'. In addition, our approach does not account for general equilibrium effects; the return to capital and labour will change in response to changes in labour supply and capital accumulation. This poses a problem when total population changes, and, in particular when there is a change in the immigration scenario. The less a small open-economy assumption applies (i.e. for Germany), the more severe the problem. Thirdly, at present, NTAs are only available for a single year whereas, as is the case for national accounts, flows are subject to business-cycle effects and therefore measured transfers are not necessarily structural. There is clearly a need for country NTAs for different years and at different points in the business cycle to assess the sensitivity of projection exercises to the base year. While these are clear limitations, some of them, like dependence of a base year, are not fundamentally different from the challenges posed by the calibration of overlappinggenerations models.
accurate. Moreover, it is not clear in which direction the results are biased as there is evidence that agespecific health costs decline after the age of 90 (Martini et al., 2007) . However, we believe it will not affect our results materially for two reasons. Firstly, while the share of 90+ year olds in the population increases, it is still small -ranging between 0.8% (Hungary) to 2% (Germany, Finland and Spain) in 2040. Secondly, this is only an issue if the structure of the population within 90+ changes markedly. For our group of countries the share of 95+ in the 90+ population increases with 10 percentage points at most (Austria).
Methodology
The primary objective of this study is to investigate to what extent NTAs enhance our understanding of the challenges to public finances from population ageing. To this end our approach to measuring demographic and economic dependency is for the most part rather standard. The innovation lies in coupling transfers to mortality rates, as explained below.
Traditional versus transfer-based demographic dependency ratios
Our baseline DDR measure is the traditional count of people above the age of 64 divided by the size of the population between the ages of 20 and 64, i.e. what is normally considered the working-age population (Table 2 ). 7
The transfer-based DDR takes into account the fact that not only is the size of the older population increasing but its composition will also change towards a larger share of people above 85 years of age. This is partly a consequence of increasing longevity and partly because the baby boomers are moving into this 85+ category with time. However, it also accounts for the fact that the age at which net government transfers turn negative lies some years before the age of 65. In addition, the age at which contributions (in public finance terms) turn positive for young people is also endogenously determined by the NTAs. Finally, the NTA-adjusted DDR includes transfers to the young. Thus, if the size of young cohorts is falling, this increases the capacity to sustain a large number of older people from a public finance perspective. Both relative levels of transfers and age cut-offs differ across countries, a fact that is not reflected in the simple DDR measure but is well accounted for in the transfer-based DDR.
Table 2. Definition of dependency ratios and main scenarios
Name Description Definition
Dependency ratios
Simple head count old-age DDR Population aged 65 and above Population aged 20 − 64
Where # indicates population at age i, are net public transfer at age i, and {. } is and indicator function taking the value 1 if true and zero otherwise.
Scenarios
SC1
Immigration
Comparison of the effect of immigration on the simple DDR and the transfer-based DDR.
SC2
Healthy ageing Health transfers are assumed to be linked to mortality changes after the age of 55. This allows for a projection of health transfers from the government given changes in age-specific mortality rates.
SC3
Longer working lives
Transfers related to labour-market participation are linked exogenously to mortality changes after the age of 55. This shifts the net transfer curve outwards (see main text and Figure 2 ).
Immigrants tend to be younger than the native-born population, thereby boosting the working-age population relative to the economically dependent population. 8 This improves the simple DDR measure, in particular if measured only as the number of older people over the working-age population (Pianese et al., 2014) . However, this simpler measure omits two important factors: first, immigrants, like natives, have children, which dampens the positive effect on the transfer-based DDR. Second, the profile of net public transfers is not constant over the working life. Young individuals below age 30 contribute relatively less than 45 year olds because they earn less on average (see Appendix A). Thus, the net contribution by a young immigrant tends to be below the average contribution by the working-age population. By using NTAs to capture the net transfers at each age, we are able to address how these two issues affect the impact of immigration on the dependency ratio.
Scenario 2. Healthy Ageing
In this scenario we compare two variants of the transfer-based DDR. One in which total net transfers in general and health transfers in particular are completely age-specific. This is equivalent to the transfer-based DDR measure considered in scenario 1 above. The second measure is one in which we assume (one form) of healthy ageing. Here healthy ageing takes the form of keeping public health transfers fixed for a given mortality rate from the age of 55 onwards. 9, 10 This shifts the government health transfer curve outwards (Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. Government health transfers for the healthy-ageing scenarios, Germany
Notes: Government health transfers in base year and in 2040 for healthy-ageing scenarios for 55 and 65 years of age, respectively. Health transfers shifted by mortality from the age of 55 are difficult to see in the figure due to the overlap with the 65+ transfer shift line. The line is flat from the age of 90 in 2000 by construction (see main text above).
Sources: NTAs and Eurostat.
Two important assumptions are implicitly embodied in this formulation of healthy ageing. In shifting only the government health transfer curve as opposed to the net health transfer curve (government health transfers minus privately financed healthcare costs), we assume that the government reaps the full benefit of lower health-care costs for a given age. 11 Secondly, we implicitly assume that there is no age-related component in (publicly financed) healthcare costs. This is likely to be a best-case scenario (Bjørner and Arnberg, 2012; Bech et al., 2011; Breyer et al., 2015) and thus gives us an upper bound for improvement in the transfer-based DDR due to healthy ageing.
Furthermore, implicit throughout our analysis is the assumption of constant relative prices. This is problematic in relation to healthcare costs if the increase in per-capita age-related health expenditure due to technological progress is considerable (Breyer et al., 2015; Breyer and Felder, 2006) . We discuss the robustness of our results in light of this observation in the results section below.
Scenario 3. Longer working lives
Securing future sustainability of public finances will have to rely to a large extent on longer average working lives. This implies that the statutory pension age will have to increase in many countries. However, the statutory pension age as such is not a good metric for assessing the length of working life because the average retirement age in many countries is well below the statutory retirement age. In a richer model environment focusing on country-specific features, assumptions can be made or behaviour modelled on how increases in the statutory retirement age and savings decisions will impact the average length of working life. From this, one could back out increases in the number of people working and relate this to the number of pensioners (see e.g. Martín, 2010; Fehr et al., 2012; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Lassila et al., 2014) .
In contrast to much of the literature on ageing and economic sustainability, the focus here is not explicitly on the statutory retirement age. Instead, we seek to simulate a shift in the effective retirement age (or equivalently labour-market employment rates at older ages) that follows projected developments in mortality. There are numerous policy challenges related to extending working lives along these lines. However, we do not consider those in detail, but only note the policy changes implicit in our approach.
Instead, the focus is on the effect on the transfer-based DDR measure of an extension of working lives in line with mortality increases at age 55 and above. We approach this by linking relevant transfers to decreases in mortality. The mechanism through which working longer alters the transfer accounts is by postponing both pension transfers from the government (positive effect on the transfer-based DDR) and the reduction in taxes and social contributions stemming from lower employment rates (negative effect). The important components of transfers are pension and health transfers. For pension transfers this implies an outward shift of the net pension transfer curve. This is somewhat in the spirit of Shoven and Goda (2010) , who suggest that age limits related to retirement are linked to mortality developments.
For health transfers, only the transfers to the government (via social security contributions and taxes) are shifted outwards along with mortality changes. Health transfers from the government are kept constant at their age-specific values in the base year. This is the opposite of the healthy-ageing scenario. Combining the two scenarios -longer working life and health ageing -would be equivalent to shifting the net health transfer curve.
Transfers related to education are shifted as a net flow. Because transfers from the government are very small if not zero at the relevant age range for the countries considered here, it makes little difference whether it is net flows or transfers to the government that are shifted with mortality changes (see Figure 3) . We assume that transfers to the government related to education are linked to employment rates and hence shift the net transfer curve according to changes in mortality and implicit employment rates. For the last component of government transfers, namely 'other government transfers', transfers to the government have a profile similar to employment rates for the considered age group (50+). We therefore adjust 'other transfers' to the government in line with mortality improvements. While it is a somewhat arbitrary choice, the age of 55 is the age after which labour-market participation started to drop off markedly at the time of the reference year (Table 3) . 12 Furthermore, one way to interpret the proposed shift is to think of reforms that increase employment rates in line with the projected increase in mortality (life expectancy) without 12 Labour-market participation and employment rates are at the present time generally higher.
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further pension compensation at retirement. We emphasise that this should not be interpreted as a projection since there has been no historical movement in labour-supply response following decreasing mortality (Milligan and Wise, 2015) . Rather, it is an estimate of the size of the policy challenge of extending the length of working lives. 
Decomposition of changes in DDRs
In order to assist in the interpretation of some of the results, it is worthwhile to decompose changes over time into components measuring population changes between net contributors and net receivers, changes within the group of receivers (and contributors), as well as changes in average net transfers to and from the government. The change in the transfer-based DDR between t and t+1 can be decomposed as follows:
With being the total population of net receivers of government transfers, receiving an average of per person. Superscript p in denotes total number of net contributers, i.e. net transfers to the government. Analogously for a superscript in denotes the average amount transferred per person. The two first terms in (1) give the contribution to the transfer-based DDR from changes in relative population shares. Intuitively, if the population of 'receivers' grows faster than that of contributors, the transfer-based DDR increases. For constant population shares of contributors and receivers, an increase in outgoing transfers (the third term) from the government (due e.g. to receivers being on average older) increases the transfer-based DDR. The opposite is the case when average transfers to the government increase (fourth term in eq. 1). We denote the effect of the sum of the first and third term for the ageing effect; and from the second and fourth term, the support effect. This terminology also facilitates comparisons across scenarios.
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For the two scenarios in which we (endogenously) change the age threshold of being a net contributor to government finances -the healthy-ageing and working-longer scenarios -the decomposition can be further expanded.
Note that we can write:
where changing mort and constant mort mean that the expression is evaluated with changing mortality and constant mortality. Focusing on the last line in (2), the two last terms are equivalent to the last two terms in (1). These are the population changes in the absence of mortality adjustments of transfers. The two first terms in (2) are the additional population shifting respectively to receivers (positive impact on the transfer-based DDR) and 'payers' (negative impact) as a consequence of the mortality adjustment. Note that these two terms are interdependent as the total size of the population is given. Thus, the combined impact can be seen as the effect of adjusting transfers by mortality.
The average in and out transfers per person are also affected and a similar decomposition can be made (not shown).
The simple DDR (SDDR) measure can be decomposed as: In this case the first term constitutes the ageing effect and the second term the support effect. We report relevant decompositions in Appendix C and refer to it throughout the remainder of the text.
Results
Traditional versus transfer-based demographic dependency ratios
The first thing to observe is that the simple head count old-age DDR measure overestimates the public finance impact of ageing for all countries in the long run (until 2040); see Table 4 . For some countries, namely Austria, Finland and Hungary, the difference is substantial. This difference can be explained by the fact that the NTA transfer-adjusted measure takes the young into account, and also that the young dependent population either declines (in some cases substantially) or increases much more slowly than the older dependent population. This latter factor slows down overall growth in the population requiring net government transfers. Another factor for the countries considered in this study is that government net transfers turn positive between the ages 56 to 63 years old. This age group is included in the NTA measure but not in the simple old-age DDR, which reduces the growth in transfers even if the share of 85+ year olds is growing (see Table 7 below). This effect would diminish if the age limit for the simple DDR was set at 60 instead of 65. The difference in the denominator plays a smaller role, except for Spain, where negative net transfers from the working-age population declines much faster than the head count measure of 20 to 64 year olds (i.e. the denominator in the old-age DDR measure).
The second thing we note is that there can be substantial differences in the short term. For Austria and Germany, e.g. the simple DDR underestimates the population-driven changes in government transfers, whereas for other countries, particularly Hungary and Finland, the opposite is the case. For both Germany and Austria, the reason is a faster deterioration of the denominator, i.e. the support, towards 2020, as measured by the transfer-based DDR relative to the simple DDR. Around one-half of the difference comes from lower average contributions by those who make positive net transfers to the government. The decomposition into ageing and support effects illustrates the differences in the nature of ageing among the seven countries and in Europe in general, depending on among other things past fertility rates (Barslund and von Werder, 2016) . Let us take Finland and Spain for purposes of illustration. The ageing effect is of similar size for the two countries, but for Finland, the support effect is negative. That is, the net transfers to the government will increase from the part of the population that makes net positive contributions. This effect naturally reduces the rate of growth in the transfer-based DDR. For Spain, net transfers from contributors fall and as a result, the growth in the transfer-based DDR is doubled.
Scenario 1. Immigration
Our starting point is the projected net migration from the baseline EUROPOP2013. All countries have projected positive net migration in the full period until 2040 (in fact until 2080), except Spain, where net migration turns positive around 2025. However, the magnitude of projected migration relative to population varies among countries (Table 5) As a result of these assumptions of the EUROPOP2013 projection, all countries will show an improvement in the demographic dependency ratio relative to a situation without migration.
Our main purpose is to explore to what extent the use of NTAs and associated government transfers affect the changes in DDR from immigration. The relevant underlying assumption for the use of NTAs is that immigrants behave as the average national citizen (in terms of fertility, mortality and labour-market participation) and have the same average endowment with respect to human capital (i.e. same average wage) and savings. 13 The total impact on the DDR of the different countries will depend on the size of immigration. Table 6 shows the reduction in the change of the DDR relative to a zero-migration scenario. Thus, the 35% for the simple DDR for Austria in 2020 indicates that the growth in the DDR will be reduced by 35% relative to a situation with zero-migration. A 100% reduction would mean no future growth in the DDR. These are reported in order to illustrate the projected impact of immigration. The main results are the respective differences in impact from the simple old-age DDR measure and the transfer-adjusted measure of DDR. In a long-term perspective to 2040, the way in which the DDR is measured makes little difference. The simple head count DDR is a good proxy for the public finance impact when it comes to net migration.
In the short term, focusing on 2020, the simple DDR tends to overstate the impact of immigration. Immigrants are young and thus their net transfer contribution is still low, but at the same time they are in the age range where fertility is relatively high, thereby giving rise to negative net transfers from children (see Appendix A). For Hungary the results differ in the short term due to the age structure of immigrants, who are primarily (even) younger than working age. 
Scenario 2: Healthy ageing
Turning to the healthy-ageing scenario, where transfers from the government are shifted with changes in mortality after age 55, what stands out is that there is a lot of heterogeneity among the countries studied (Table 7 ). The effect of healthy ageing relative to the baseline transferbased DDR depends on the change in the composition of the population above 55 years of age and how much healthcare accounts for total transfers to the old. Since the latter is not constant across ages, the two effects also interact. How much the healthy-ageing scenario will reduce the impact of ageing also depends on the steepness of the mortality (age)-specific health transfer curve. A steeper curve implies a larger impact from healthy ageing on the dependency ratio. In Slovenia and Sweden, a bit less than one-third of net health and pension transfers to those aged 55 and above are healthcare transfers. In Germany, the corresponding number is onefourth, whereas for Hungary the share is one-fifth. Health-related transfers to older people in Austria, Hungary and Finland constitute only around 15% or below of public transfers. The countries are equally different when it comes to the change in the age distribution of the population above age 65 until 2040. Finland and Hungary will see an increase of close to 70% in the share aged 85 and above. For Slovenia, the figure is 50%, and in Germany and Sweden it is increasing by one-third. Austria and Spain face a relatively constant age distribution with the number of 85+ year olds increasing marginally faster than the overall number of 65+ year olds.
For Austria and Hungary, healthy ageing is projected to have little impact until 2040. These two countries record the lowest health share in overall transfers. The largest impact is shown for Sweden where healthy ageing reduces the projected increase in the DDR by more than onethird. Minor effects are found in Germany, Slovenia and Spain. Looking at the decomposition in Appendix C, healthy ageing has a negligible support effect. A small effect comes from slightly larger net transfers due to a decrease in government healthcare transfers (an effect that is not visible in the appendix due to rounding). Similarly, the main ageing effect comes from a decrease in net transfers. An exception is Spain where the threshold for the age of being a net contribution changes from 60 to 62 in the healthy-ageing scenario. As a result average net transfers from the government for 'support receivers' go up while the number of people being supported declines.
Apart from the fact that health transfers are (much) smaller than pension transfers (see Appendix D), the steepness of the age-transfer curve (in the base year) also differs between pension and health transfers. For all countries the net pension transfer curve has a steeper age gradient than the health curve, although less notably so for Sweden. This implies that as countries age, net health transfers become less important relative to pension transfers.
If healthy ageing implies that healthcare costs are reduced by less than the reduction in mortality, the impact on the transfer-based DDR is roughly proportionally smaller.
As noted above, there is some evidence that per capita age-related health costs grow faster than income and prices in general (Breyer and Felder, 2006) . Such a scenario is inconsistent with our 'constant world' assumption. However, we can get some idea of how a 1% annual increase in age-related per capita costs would impact our results by shifting the government health transfer curve by 1% annually. This is a worst-case scenario vis-à-vis our assumptions because it implies that healthcare contribution transfers to the government stay fixed. An annual 1% growth until 2040 would mean that age-specific transfers would be around 30% higher in 2040. In this case a healthy ageing scenario will have a larger impact in terms of reducing the growth of the transfer-based DDR until 2040, because health transfers will be a larger share of total transfers in 2040. Under such a scenario, healthy ageing becomes increasingly important. For Germany, Spain, Finland and Slovenia, healthy ageing now limits the growth in the transfer-adjusted DDR by 25 to 30%. For Hungary and Austria, the number is 20%. In Sweden, where healthy ageing has a large impact in the base scenario, the increase in the transfer-based DDR is 60% smaller.
These results lead us to be cautious about putting too little emphasis on healthy ageing for future sustainability of public finances, even if in most countries the impact on the transferadjusted DDR of pension transfers dwarfs that of health transfers.
Longer working lives
For the seven countries considered here, the shift in the transfer curve is equivalent to a shift in behaviour of around five years. Thus, in 2040, a 60-year old is assumed to have the same behaviour -with respect to labour-market participation -as a 55-year old had in the base year. 14 Based on labour-market participation rates from Eurostat's labour force statistics (see Table 3 above), we make assumptions about labour force participation of 55-year olds for the reference year of the country's NTA (Table 8 ) and implicitly assume that the difference between labour force participation and employment is structural in the reference year. 15 To arrive at the implied increase in average working life for each country, the labour-market participation rate is multiplied by the implicit number of years, between 4.5 (Sweden) and 8.6 (Hungary), the transfer schedule is shifted (Table 8) . For Germany the labour force participation rate in the base year of a 55-year old is calculated to be 73.7. Extending this to the age of 60.6 (adding 5.6 year to 55) in line with mortality improvements adds 4.1 working years to the average length of working life. The impact on demographic dependency ratios from an increase in working lives is substantial. In Germany, Spain and Austria the expansion of the demographic dependency ratio is diminished by around more than half (Table 9 ). In the case of Finland the DDR will be little bigger in 2040 compared to today. The same is almost the case with Sweden where the DDR will only grow 15% towards 2040 in this scenario. For Slovenia the impact is somewhat less substantial. The result for Hungary arises because the transfer-based DDR not only grows slower as a consequence of longer working lives, but is actually reduced relative to the base year transfer-adjusted DDR. The decomposition of the changes relative to the baseline transfer-based DDR shows the change (in absolute percentage points) in the ageing effect to be rather uniform across countries with Hungary being an exception. The larger decrease in the ageing effect is due to the relatively longer extension of working lives (cf. Table 8 ). The support effect shows more variation. In particular, it explains the relatively subdued effect for Slovenia, despite a substantial prolongation of the working life. The shift in the net-transfer curve in the case of Slovenia only improves the support effect marginally (not detectable with two decimals in the table) because 55-year olds in Slovenia make only marginally net transfer contributions to the Government.
The reported scenario for longer working lives builds upon the EUROPOP2020 base line population projections, including immigration as outlined above. If the healthy-ageing scenario is added, some additional percentage points' reduction in the increase in the DDR is obtained.
Extending working lives is of central importance to meeting the fiscal challenge of ageing. For most countries the effect of working longer dwarfs the potential available in increasing immigration or healthy ageing. Changes in retirement behaviour and hence length of working life do not automatically come about as longevity and health increases. In fact, from a life-cycle consumption model point of view, it may be optimal to spend longer time in retirement as longevity increases (Bloom et al., 2014; Leinonen et al., 2015) . What is presented here is a bestcase scenario, both in terms of behavioural responses and as regards the speed of policyinduced changes. In our simulation, the effect on the transfer-based DDR is roughly proportional to the assumed lengthening of working life as a function of mortality.
Conclusion
In this study, we define a transfer-based demographic dependency ratio which takes into account a number of important features of ongoing demographic changes, not least from a public-finance perspective. Our measure takes into account that the number of young people is declining in many countries, which reduces transfers to this segment of the population. It also accounts for the fact that net transfers have large variations within the group of older people. This means that the composition of the group of older people is important, a factor that the simple DDR ignores. Furthermore, the transfer-based DDR explicitly acknowledges that the age range in which people are net contributors to, as opposed to net receivers of public transfers varies among countries. Finally, the new measure also accommodates changes in the composition of net contributors (or the working-age population). None of these demographic developments shows up in the simple DDR measure.
Our results show that one has to be careful when assessing the impact of population ageing by the simple head-count measure of the demographic dependency ratio. We find that using the simple measure of the transfer-based DDR can significantly distort the challenges facedin a negative direction.
The transfer-based DDR allows us to simulate the impact of healthy ageing and extended working lives under different assumptions. The baseline definition of healthy ageing used here links government health transfers to mortality developments for the different age groups. As argued, this is likely a best-case scenario because it assumes no direct effect of chronological age once mortality is accounted for. However, healthy ageing shows in general not to make much of a dent in the increase in net public transfers driven by demographics. If health costs increase in relative terms, this could change the importance of healthy ageing because the health transfer component of net transfers to older people increases in size. Of course, this result implies that the public-finance challenge of ageing increases as well.
For the longer working-lives scenario, our starting point is the literature on prospective ageing. We implicitly assume that labour-market behaviour, and hence associated transfers, changes with mortality after the age of 55. Transfers related to labour-market behaviour become a function of mortality. The results point to an increase in the average length of a working life by three to five years. For most of the countries studied, this makes a decisive reduction in the increase of projected net public transfers.
Finally, we stress the uncertainties involved in such multi-country macro projections, but nevertheless believe that the methods used here can be useful when comparing countries and in assessing the broad impact of policy initiatives. As National Transfer Accounts become available for more and more countries and for more years, there is further scope for crossvalidation of the assumptions made and the results reached in this study.
Appendix C. Decomposition of the total growth in demographic dependency ratios (different scenarios) 
